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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1790| Title: | Approval Voting on Dichotomous Preferences |
| Keywords: | Approval Voting Dichotomous Preferences Social Choice Function Social Welfare Function |
| Description: | The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization. This research was undertaken with support from the fellowship 2001FI-00451 of the Generalitat de Catalunya and from the research grant BEC2002-02130 of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología of Spain. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1790 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1790 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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