Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1783| Title: | Employment by Lotto Revisited |
| Keywords: | Employment by lotto Random mechanism Two-sided matching Stability |
| Description: | Trabajo publicado como artículo en International Game Theory Review 11: 181-198 (2009).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S0219198909002248 We study employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999), a matching algorithm for the so-called stable marriage problem. We complement Aldershof et al.'s analysis in two ways. First, we give an alternative and intuitive description of employment by lotto. Second, we disprove Aldershof et al.'s conjectures concerning employment by lotto for general matching markets. B. Klaus's and F. Klijn's research was supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. F. Klijn's work was also partially supported by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1783 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1783 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.