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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1776Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Pérez-Castrillo, David | - |
| dc.creator | Wettstein, David | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-31T15:09:15Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-31T15:09:15Z | - |
| dc.date | 2004-12-14 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:51Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1776 | - |
| dc.identifier | 10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1776 | - |
| dc.description | Revised Version of the Paper UFAE and IAE Working Papers nr. 560.03. Published in the Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 127, Issue 1, March 2006, Pages 296-308. | - |
| dc.description | We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and call it the Ordinal Shapley value (OSV). We characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show it is monotone and anonymous. Finally, similarly to the weighted Shapely value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 634.04 | - |
| dc.relation | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.007 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Non-Transferable utility games | - |
| dc.subject | Shapley value | - |
| dc.subject | Ordinal Shapley value | - |
| dc.subject | Consistency | - |
| dc.title | An Ordinal Shapley Value for Economic Environments [Revised Version] | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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