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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1772Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Courtois, Pierre | - |
| dc.creator | Haeringer, Guillaume | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-31T14:36:37Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-31T14:36:37Z | - |
| dc.date | 2005-09-08 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:51Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:51Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1772 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1772 | - |
| dc.description | We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements when cooperation means to commit to a minimum abatement level. Each country decides whether to ratify the agreement and this latter enters into force only if it is ratified by a number of countries at least equal to some ratification threshold. We analyze the role played by ratification threshold rules and provide conditions for international environmental agreements to enter into force. We show that a large typology of agreements can enter into force among the one constituted by the grand coalition. | - |
| dc.description | Financial support from the Barcelona Economics - CREA program is gratefully acknowledged. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 652.05 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | International Environmental Agreement | - |
| dc.subject | Abatement bound | - |
| dc.subject | Self-enforcing agreement | - |
| dc.subject | Coalition formation | - |
| dc.subject | Ratification threshold | - |
| dc.title | The Making of International Environmental Agreements | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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