Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Pérez-Castrillo, David	-
dc.creator	Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc	-
dc.date	2007-10-31T12:26:15Z	-
dc.date	2007-10-31T12:26:15Z	-
dc.date	2005-01-10	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:57:50Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:57:50Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1768	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1768	-
dc.description	Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) and Veszteg (2004) propose the use of a multibidding mechanism for situations where agents have to choose a common project. Examples are decisions involving public goods (or public "bads"). We report experimental results to test the practical tractability and effectiveness of the multibidding mechanisms in environments where agents hold private information concerning their valuation of the projects. The mechanism performed quite well in the laboratory: it provided the ex post efficient outcome in roughly three quarters of the cases across the treatments; moreover, the largest part of the subject pool formed their bids according to the theoretical bidding behavior.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	638.05	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Experiments	-
dc.subject	Mechanisms	-
dc.subject	Uncertainty	-
dc.title	Experimental Evidence on the Multibidding Mechanism	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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