Efficient Bidding with Externalities

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Macho-Stadler, Inés	-
dc.creator	Pérez-Castrillo, David	-
dc.creator	Wettstein, David	-
dc.date	2007-10-31T12:19:25Z	-
dc.date	2007-10-31T12:19:25Z	-
dc.date	2005-02-10	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:57:50Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:57:50Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1763	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1763	-
dc.description	We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals.	-
dc.description	The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from BEC 2003-01132. Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo also acknowledge the finantial support of Generalitat de Catalunya (2001 SGR-00162 and Barcelona Economics, CREA).	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	641.05	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Implementation	-
dc.subject	Externalities	-
dc.subject	Bidding	-
dc.subject	Shapley value	-
dc.title	Efficient Bidding with Externalities	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
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