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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1761Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Brandts, Jordi | - |
| dc.creator | Cooper, David J. | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-31T12:14:39Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-31T12:14:39Z | - |
| dc.date | 2005-02-18 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:49Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:49Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1761 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1761 | - |
| dc.description | We study manager-employee interactions in experiments set in a corporate environment where payoffs depend on employees coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In the absence of managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure, managers have two instruments at their disposal, increasing employees' financial incentives to coordinate and communication with employees. We find that communication is a more effective tool than incentive changes for leading organizations out of performance traps. Examining the content of managers' communication, the most effective messages specifically request a high effort, point out the mutual benefits of high effort, and imply that employees are being paid well. | - |
| dc.description | The authors thank the NSF (SES-0214310), the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura (SEC2002-01352), the BBVA Foundation, and the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA for financial help. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 643.05 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Change | - |
| dc.subject | Incentives | - |
| dc.subject | Coordination | - |
| dc.subject | Communication | - |
| dc.subject | Experiments | - |
| dc.subject | Organizations | - |
| dc.title | It's What You Say Not What You Pay | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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