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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1730| Title: | Weighted Approval Voting |
| Keywords: | Approval Voting Neutrality |
| Description: | To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1730 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1730 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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