Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1727| Title: | Constrained School Choice |
| Keywords: | School choice Matching Top trading cycles Boston mechanism |
| Description: | Trabajo publicado como artículo en Journal of Economic Theory 144(5): 1921-1947 (2009).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.002 Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely to get distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guarantee stability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal action as lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1727 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1727 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.