Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1707
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dc.creatorBeviá, Carmen-
dc.creatorCorchón, Luis C.-
dc.date2007-10-30T13:23:47Z-
dc.date2007-10-30T13:23:47Z-
dc.date2007-04-23-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T00:57:44Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-31T00:57:44Z-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1707-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1707-
dc.descriptionWe characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.-
dc.descriptionThe first author acknowledges financial support from SEJ2005-01481/ECON and FEDER, 2005SGR-00454, and the Barcelona Economics Program, CREA. The second author acknowledges financial support from SEJ2005-06167/ECON.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationUFAE and IAE Working Papers-
dc.relation696.07-
dc.rightsopenAccess-
dc.subjectCooperative production-
dc.subjectSharing rules-
dc.subjectEfficiency-
dc.titleCooperative Production and Efficiency-
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo-
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