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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1706| Title: | Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance |
| Keywords: | Environmental regulation Audits and compliance Environmental standards |
| Description: | Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1706 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1706 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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