Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1706Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Macho-Stadler, Inés | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-30T13:22:50Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-30T13:22:50Z | - |
| dc.date | 2006-11-20 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:44Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:44Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1706 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1706 | - |
| dc.description | Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 673.06 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Environmental regulation | - |
| dc.subject | Audits and compliance | - |
| dc.subject | Environmental standards | - |
| dc.title | Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.