Repeated Games Played in a Network

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1704

Title:	Repeated Games Played in a Network
Keywords:	Repeated Game Network Delayed Perfect Monitoring Communication
Description:	Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.
URI:	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1704
Other Identifiers:	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1704
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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