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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1692Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Klaus, Bettina | - |
| dc.creator | Klijn, Flip | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-30T12:49:00Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-30T12:49:00Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-06-20 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:43Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:43Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1692 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1692 | - |
| dc.description | We consider one-to-one matching (roommate) problems in which agents (students) can either be matched as pairs or remain single. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we review a key result for roommate problems (the ``lonely wolf'' theorem) for which we provide a concise and elementary proof. Second, and related to the title of this paper, we show how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems. | - |
| dc.description | F. Klijn's research was supported through the Spanish Plan Nacional I+D+I (SEJ2005- 01690) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (SGR2005-00626 and the Barcelona Economics Program of XREA). | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 706.07 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Roommate Problem | - |
| dc.subject | Stability | - |
| dc.subject | Fairness | - |
| dc.title | Smith and Rawls Share a Room | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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