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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Massó, Jordi | - |
| dc.creator | Nicolò, Antonio | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-29T17:35:47Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-29T17:35:47Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-10-15 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:39Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:39Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1684 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1684 | - |
| dc.description | We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. | - |
| dc.description | The work of Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science through grant SEJ2005-01481/ECON and FEDER and through project CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010 (CDS2006-00016), and by the Generalitat de Catalunya through grant SGR2005-00454 and through the Barcelona Economics Program (XREA). The work of Nicolò is partially supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research through grant 2005137858. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | 714.07 | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Public goods | - |
| dc.subject | Gregarious Preferences | - |
| dc.subject | Subgame Perfect Implementation | - |
| dc.title | Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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